Efficient Key Generation by Exploiting Randomness from Channel Responses of Individual OFDM Subcarriers by Zhang, Junqing et al.
Efficient Key Generation by Exploiting Randomness from
Channel Responses of Individual OFDM Subcarriers
Zhang, J., Marshall, A., Woods, R., & Duong, T. Q. (2016). Efficient Key Generation by Exploiting Randomness
from Channel Responses of Individual OFDM Subcarriers. IEEE Transactions on Communications, 64(6), 2578 -
2588. DOI: 10.1109/TCOMM.2016.2552165
Published in:
IEEE Transactions on Communications
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
Copyright 2016 IEEE.
This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. Please refer to any applicable terms of use of the publisher.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:06. Mar. 2017
Efficient Key Generation by Exploiting Randomness
from Channel Responses of Individual OFDM
Subcarriers
Junqing Zhang, Alan Marshall, Senior Member, IEEE, Roger Woods, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Trung Q. Duong, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Key generation from the randomness of wireless
channels is a promising technique to establish a secret cryp-
tographic key securely between legitimate users. This paper
proposes a new approach to extract keys efficiently from channel
responses of individual orthogonal frequency-division multiplex-
ing (OFDM) subcarriers. The efficiency is achieved by (i) fully
exploiting randomness from time and frequency domains and (ii)
improving the cross-correlation of the channel measurements.
Through the theoretical modelling of the time and frequency
autocorrelation relationship of the OFDM subcarrier’s channel
responses, we can obtain the optimal probing rate and use
multiple uncorrelated subcarriers as random sources. We also
study the effects of non-simultaneous measurements and noise
on the cross-correlation of the channel measurements. We find
the cross-correlation is mainly impacted by noise effects in a
slow fading channel and use a low pass filter (LPF) to reduce
the key disagreement rate and extend the system’s working
signal-to-noise ratio range. The system is evaluated in terms of
randomness, key generation rate, and key disagreement rate,
verifying that it is feasible to extract randomness from both
time and frequency domains of the OFDM subcarrier’s channel
responses.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, key generation, OFDM,
time and frequency autocorrelation, channel reciprocity
I. INTRODUCTION
The broadcast nature of wireless communications allows all
the users within range to hear the transmission, thus making
it vulnerable to various active and passive attacks. Wireless
network security and privacy thus has attracted many research
interest [1]–[4]. In 5G networks, many new techniques have
emerged, such as full-duplex communications [5], large-scale
MIMO [6], etc. Physical layer security (PLS), which ex-
ploits channel characteristics to provide information-theoretic
security for wireless communications, has been extensively
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researched for the protection of future 5G networks [7]. Key
generation, an active research direction of PLS, automatically
generates keys at each side of two legitimate users, Alice
and Bob, from the randomness of their common wireless
channel [8], [9]. This technique exploits unpredictable channel
characteristics, which is information theoretically secure [10].
It is low complexity and does not require the aid of other
nodes, thus representing a promising alternative to public
key cryptography to establish keys for classical symmetric
encryption.
Key generation system is evaluated in terms of key random-
ness, key generation rate (KGR), and key disagreement rate
(KDR). Randomness is the most important feature for the key
sequence as the key generated is used for encryption and/or
authentication. A less random key will result in a smaller
search space by brute force attacks thus compromising the
security of the cryptographic system. KGR is an essential
factor for the practical application of key generation system.
It quantifies the number of key bits generated in each second,
which can be given as
KGR =
Nk
Tk
; (1)
where Nk is the number of keys and Tk is the time taken.
Cryptography usually needs a key sequence with a certain
length, e.g., advanced encryption standards (AES) requires a
key length at least 128 bits, so a too low KGR will limit its
application. KDR is the disagreement rate of the raw key bits
quantized from the measurements, which is defined as
KDR =
PNk
i=1 jKA(i) KB(i)j
Nk
; (2)
where KA and KB are the keys generated at Alice and Bob,
respectively. The disagreement is corrected by information
reconciliation techniques. A lower KDR can always decrease
the reconciliation overhead and reveal less information during
the public discussion. Therefore, an efficient key generation
system should have a high KGR and small KDR with the
premise of generating random keys. KGR can be improved by
leveraging fine-grained channel state information (CSI) and
exploiting randomness fully from temporal, frequency, and
spatial domains. KDR can be decreased by improving the
signal cross-correlation. In the following of this introduction,
we review key generation channel parameters, randomness
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2exploitation from different domains, and measurement cross-
correlation improvement.
Several practical and simulation systems have been reported
for extracting keys from coarse-grained channel parameters,
such as received signal strength (RSS) [11]–[18], channel
phase in narrowband systems [19], [20], and deep fades of the
signal envelop [21], etc. However, all of this work only extracts
keys from a single dimension or a single frequency, which
results in a low KGR and therefore limits their practical ap-
plication. Although some research effort has attempted to im-
prove the KGR by leveraging multi-antenna [14] and/or multi-
bit quantization [16], it remains that these single-dimensional
approaches lose much useful information.
Key generation from fine-grained CSI can achieve a higher
KGR [22], [23]. A practical CSI-based key generation sys-
tem was proposed to quantize channel responses in the fre-
quency domain from all subcarriers in orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) systems [22], which may in-
troduce redundancy and correlation between keys especially
in a frequency flat fading channel. Later, another CSI-based
key generation protocol called KEEP that uses a validation-
recombination mechanism was designed [23]. However, it is
difficult to reach an agreement in low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) environments as even a single bit mismatch will result
in a failure of the entire process and thereafter require a new
validation-recombination process. In this paper, we also exploit
channel randomness from CSI but in a different manner, i.e.,
by extracting keys from the channel responses of individual
OFDM subcarriers over time. This provides a thorough theo-
retical modelling of the system and channel, and enables us
to obtain the optimal probing rate and maximize the KGR,
which will be discussed later.
The randomness in time, frequency, and spatial domains
can be used for key extraction. While spatial randomness
exploitation has been extensively analyzed in [24]–[28], this
paper focuses on randomness extraction from time and fre-
quency domains. The temporal randomness is the main random
source for key generation as it can be easily introduced by the
movement of the users and/or any objects within the commu-
nication environments [11]–[16], [25]. Frequency variation is
another random source which currently receives less attention.
Frequency diversity is intrinsically determined by the delay
spread of multipath channel, which has been used for key
generation in ultrawideband channel [29]. There has been
research reported exploiting frequency diversity from RSS
using channel hopping [17], [18], from channel measurements
of multiple FM radios [30], or from CSI in IEEE 802.11
OFDM systems [22], [23]. However, a detailed theoretical
modelling and analysis of the temporal and frequency corre-
lation is missing, which restricts the capability to exploit the
randomness of the channel.
The cross-correlation of the channel measurements of Alice
and Bob is essential for the success of key generation. The
statistical features of the same carrier frequency at each
end are reciprocal, which is the basis of this type of key
generation [13]. Most of the current commercial devices work
in half-duplex mode, and the cross-correlation of the received
signals measured at Alice and Bob are impacted by the non-
simultaneous measurements (probing) and noise. Even when
Alice and Bob measure the channel at the same frequency
and time using full-duplex hardware1, the noise at each side
will still be independent and uncorrelated as they reside
in two different hardware platforms. Non-identical channel
measurements introduce key disagreement, while a too high
KDR may result in a failure of the entire key generation
process. There has been research in compensating the non-
simultaneous measurements using interpolation [15], [16] and
suppressing the noise by filtering [11], [21], [22], [31]. How-
ever, the cross-correlation of the channel measurements has
not yet been modelled theoretically, therefore, the design of
the interpolation or filter algorithms are mainly empirical,
resulting in a less effective improvement on the correlation.
In this paper, we propose a new efficient CSI-based key gen-
eration system by exploiting both the temporal and frequency
randomness from channel responses of individual OFDM
subcarriers. As part of the ongoing WiPhyLoc8 project [32],
this paper aims to develop novel and practical approaches for
wireless security. We carried out the analysis by considering
a practical scenario, i.e., by incorporating an IEEE 802.11
OFDM transceiver model and a time-varying multipath chan-
nel model. This offers guidelines to implement a real key
generation system in the testbed. Our contributions are:
 Efficient key generation from the channel responses of
individual OFDM sucbarriers. By theoretically modelling
the subcarrier’s channel responses, it is demonstrated that
they are fine-grained channel parameter which provides
detailed channel properties in both time and frequency
domains.
 By theoretically modelling the time and frequency au-
tocorrelation relationship of OFDM subcarrier’s channel
responses, we can fully exploit the randomness of the
channel in both time and frequency domains by obtaining
the optimal probing rate and using multiple subcarriers
as random source. Therefore, we can greatly improve the
KGR while guaranteeing the randomness of the keys.
 By theoretically modelling the effects of non-
simultaneous measurements and noise on the cross-
correlation of the channel measurements, we found
that noise plays a more dominant role in a slow fading
channel and thereof employed a finite impulse response
(FIR) low pass filter (LPF) to effectively target the high
frequency components of the noise and significantly
improve the correlation. The employment of LPF helps
reduce the KDR and extend the working SNR range.
In previous work, we have analyzed the temporal variation
of the OFDM subcarrier’s channel response and verified its
application in key generation in [33] and used an LPF to
improve the correlation of the measurements in [34]. In this
paper, we considerably extend and complement this work by
providing a theoretical and extensive modelling and analysis
of the channel, time and frequency domains autocorrelation re-
lationship, and cross-correlation of the channel measurements.
1In full-duplex system, transceivers can work in different carrier frequen-
cies, but their channel responses will be different and cannot be used for key
generation.
3The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes OFDM channel model and the simulation model.
Sections III and IV theoretically analyze the time and fre-
quency autocorrelation relationship of the channel responses
and channel measurements cross-correlation, respectively. The
performance of our key generation system is evaluated in
Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
A. Multipath Channel
A dynamic multipath channel with lots of reflection, scatter-
ing, and refraction of the electromagnetic wave is an ideal ran-
dom source for key generation. The channel impulse response
(CIR) h(; t) of such a multipath channel can be written as
h(; t) =
L 1X
l=0
h(l; t)(   l); (3)
where h(l; t) and l are the attenuation and delay of lth
channel tap, respectively, l = lT , and T is the sampling
period of the system, L is the total number of the channel
taps and () is the Dirac delta function.
When there is rich scattering, the channel can be modelled
as a wide sense stationary uncorrelated scattering (WSSUS)
random process [35]. Under this model, the attenuation of
each channel tap h(l; t) is a WSS random process and
the attenuations of any two taps with different delays, i.e.,
h(l; t) and h(j ; t), are uncorrelated. Therefore, the temporal
autocorrelation function (ACF) rh(;t) is given by
rh(;t) = Efh(; t)h(; t+t)g: (4)
The normalized temporal ACF of h(l; t) can also be further
defined as
Rh(l;t) =
rh(l;t)
rh(l; 0)
: (5)
WSS is a common channel model and has been verified
by experimental measurements for a rich scattering environ-
ment [36]. It is suitable to describe the channel correlation
when the Doppler spread is fixed, i.e., the channel is always
changing in the same rate. In real channels, this assump-
tion may not be satisfied due to the uncontrolled movement
of objects and thereof variable Doppler spread. Under this
circumstance, the channel can be divided into small time
frames and each frame can be approximated as a WSS random
process [37].
B. OFDM Model
In OFDM systems, the transmitted signal consists of mul-
tiple OFDM symbols xq[m], which can be written as
xq[m] =
1p
M
M 1X
k=0
Xq[k]e
j2km=M ; (6)
where Xq[k] is the data modulated to the kth subcarrier in
qth OFDM symbol in frequency domain at tq , xq[m] is the
mth sample in qth OFDM symbol in time domain, and M
is the number of total subcarriers. In an OFDM system with
BW Hz channel spacing andM evenly distributed subcarriers,
the frequency of each subcarrier is given as
fk = k
BW
M
; (7)
where BW = 1T .
The transmitted signal xq[m] experiences the multipath
effect and is affected by the noise. After synchronization, the
received signal can be written as [38]
yq[m] =
L 1X
l=0
xq[m  "q   l]hq[l] + nq[m]; (8)
where nq[m] is the additive Gaussian white noise (AWGN) and
nq[m]  CN (0; 2n); "q is the time offset due to the imperfect
synchronization and is determined by the synchronization
algorithm, SNR, and the multipath effect; hq[l] is the discrete
form of h(l; t), and is assumed to remain unchanged during
one OFDM symbol, which is a fair assumption in a slow fading
environment.
When the synchronization time offset is small, the equiva-
lent frequency domain value Yq[k] can be written as [38]
Yq[k] =
1p
M
M 1X
m=0
yq[m]e
 j2km=M
= Xq[k]Hq[k]e
 j2k"q=M + wq[k]; (9)
where
Hq[k] =
L 1X
l=0
hq[l]e
 j2kl=M ; (10)
wq[k] =
1p
M
M 1X
m=0
nq[m]e
 j2km=M : (11)
Least square (LS) channel estimation can get a noisy
observation of the channel responses in OFDM systems, which
can be given as
bHq[k] = Yq[k]
Xq[k]
= eHq[k] + bwq[k]; (12)
where eHq[k] = Hq[k]e j2k"q=M ; (13)
bwq[k] = wq[k]
Xq[k]
: (14)
It can be calculated that
2eH = 2H =
L 1X
l=0
2hl ; (15)
2bw = 2w = 2n; (16)
2bH = 2H + 2w: (17)
The above variances do not depend on the subcarrier index k
which is omitted. Therefore, the channel responses of all the
subcarriers will have the same SNR which can be given as
SNRf =
E
h
j eHq[k]j2i
E [j bw[k]j2] = 2H2w : (18)
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SIMULATION PARAMETERS
IEEE 802.11 OFDM channel spacing BW 20 MHz
Hardware sampling frequency 1
T
20 MHz
Doppler spread fd 6 Hz
Root mean square delay spread  50 ns
Total sampling time 500 s
It should be noted that as the mean square error (MSE) of
LS channel estimation is inversely proportional to SNR [39],
which is not as accurate as some other algorithms, e.g.,
minimum mean square error (MMSE) channel estimation.
However, it is widely applied in commercial OFDM systems
such as IEEE 802.11 OFDM. Therefore, in order to make the
analysis in this paper more general, LS channel estimation is
still adopted.
C. Simulation Model
A Matlab simulation model is implemented as an example
for analysis. The transceiver is implemented according to the
IEEE 802.11 OFDM protocol [40]. The statistical channel
is modelled as a time-variant multipath fading channel [41]
and a WSSUS random process. The average power of each
channel tap follows an exponential-decay power delay profile
and a Bell-shaped Doppler power spectrum [42], which is
recommended by the IEEE working group. The normalized
Doppler power spectral density (PSD) can be given as
S(f) =
p
A=(fd)
1 +A( ffd )
2
; (19)
where A is a constant, e.g., in IEEE 802.11 channel, A = 9 and
fd is the Doppler spread, whose values were found to be up
to approximately 6 Hz at a center frequency of 5.25 GHz and
up to approximately 3 Hz at a center frequency of 2.4 GHz by
experiments in indoor environment [42]. PSD and normalized
temporal ACF form an IFFT pair. Therefore, the corresponding
temporal ACF of the Bell-shaped Doppler spectrum can be
given by
R(t) = e
  2fdp
A
t
: (20)
For the simplicity of analysis, all the channel taps are modelled
to have the same PSD.
The simulation parameters are shown in Table I. Unless
otherwise specified, the results in this paper are based on the
above simulation model and parameters. However, it is worth
noting that our system and analyses work for other OFDM
standards and multipath channels as well.
III. ANALYSIS OF TIME AND FREQUENCY
AUTOCORRELATION
In a dynamic multipath environment, the signal experiences
time-selective and frequency-selective fading. In order to gen-
erate a random key sequence, the sampled data should be
uncorrelated. The correlation relationship of Hq[k] can be
characterized by the time and frequency ACF and given as [43]
rH(f;t) = EfHq[k]Hp[i]g
=
L 1X
l=0
rh(l;t)e
 j2fl ; (21)
and the normalized correlation function of Hq[k] can be
written as
RH(f;t) =
rH(f;t)
rH(0; 0)
=
PL 1
l=0 rh(l;t)e
 j2flPL 1
l=0 rh(l; 0)
; (22)
where f = fi   fk = (i  k)BWM , t = tp   tq .
The time and frequency ACF of eHq[k] and bwq[k] can be
calculated as
r eH(fk; fi;t) = rH(f;t)Efej2(k"q i"p)=Mg; (23)
and
r bw(f;t) = rw(f;t) = (f)(t)2w; (24)
respectively.
Therefore, the time and frequency ACF of the channel
estimation bHq[k] can be given as
r bH(fk; fi;t) = r eH(fk; fi;t) + r bw(f;t)
= rH(f;t)Efej2(k"q i"p)=Mg+ rw(f;t); (25)
and the normalized correlation function of bHq[k] can be
written as
R bH(fk; fi;t) = r bH(fk; fi;t)r bH(fk; fk; 0)
=
rH(f;t)Efej2(k"q i"p)=Mg+ rw(f;t)
rH(0; 0) + rw(0; 0)
=
RH(f;t)SNRfEfej2(k"q i"p)=Mg+ (f)(t)
1 + SNRf
:
(26)
A. Time Correlation
In a dynamic environment with random movement, the
signal experiences time-selective fading, which is the main
random source for key generation. The users harvest the
entropy by probing the channel and getting the channel mea-
surements. A smaller probing rate enjoys a higher KGR but
compromises the randomness of the generated key sequence
due to the correlation between the sampled data, while a
larger probing rate results in a lower KGR and limits its
practical application. Key sequence is used in cryptographic
applications and should be random. Optimal probing rate is
defined as the minimum probing rate which can guarantee the
randomness of the key sequence.
The channel variation in the time domain can be charac-
terized by the temporal ACF. The channel coherence time
can statistically approximate the time duration over which the
CIR is essentially invariant and quantifies the similarity of the
channel response [44]. It is usually defined by the time over
5which the coefficient of the temporal ACF is above 50%. The
definition can be further extended to X% coherence time [45]
and be used for all the random process, which is given as
R(Tc(X%)) = X%: (27)
In this section, under the assumption that h(; t) is a
WSSUS random process, we model the R bH(fk;t) and
RH(fk;t), and prove bHq[k] andHq[k] are also WSS random
processes. The WSS property guarantees that the data sampled
by the same time interval t will have the same correlation
relationship. Based on the temporal ACF, the optimal probing
rate can be determined.
For the kth subcarrier, the mean value of Hq[k] is 0. The
normalized temporal ACF of the Hq[k] can be obtained by
letting f = 0 in (22), which can be given as
RH(0;t) =
PL 1
l=0 rh(l;t)PL 1
l=0 rh(l; 0)
=
PL 1
l=0 (rh(l; 0)Rh(t))PL 1
l=0 rh(l; 0)
= Rh(t): (28)
The second equality holds because in this paper, all the channel
taps have the same temporal ACF, i.e.,
Rh(l;t) = Rh(t); l = 0; 1; :::; L  1: (29)
As the mean value is a constant and ACF only depends on the
time delay, Hq[k] is a WSS random process.
The normalized temporal ACF of the imperfectly synchro-
nized channel estimation can be calculated by letting fi = fk,
i.e, f = 0, in (26) and written as
R bH(fk;t) = RH(0;t)SNRfEfe
j2k("q "p)=Mg+ (t)
1 + SNRf
:
(30)
R bH(fk;t) is also only determined by t and irrelevant to
the observation time, therefore, it is a WSS process.
Fig. 1 shows several results for Rh(l;t), RH(fk;t),
and R bH(fk;t) from the simulation to validate the above an-
alytic analysis. R0bH(f1;t) is calculated by letting "q "p = 0
to show the reference ACF if perfect synchronization were
achieved. Firstly, all the shown Rh(l;t) and RH(fk;t)
values are equal, which matches the analytic expression (28).
Secondly, RH(fk;t) and R bH(fk;t) observed at t1, match
their counterparts at t2 quite well, respectively, which validates
that Hq[k] and bHq[k] are WSS random processes. Lastly,
R bH(fk;t) observed at t1 vary according to the subcarrier
index k, which matches the analytical expression (30).
Previous key generation research has claimed that the
probing rate should be larger than 50% coherence time in
order to get a random key sequence. However, it has been
observed that whenever the experiments were carried out, the
authors usually chose the probing rate to be large enough to
exceed the expected coherence time [22]. However, in this
paper we calculate the X% coherence time Tc(X%) based
on the temporal ACF of the random process, and use it as
the probing rate to sample the channel. The optimal probing
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Fig. 2. Frequency ACFs, 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R bH(fk; fi; 0).
rate can then be found by evaluating the randomness of the
key sequence sampled by different Tc(X%), which is a major
difference from previous work. The detailed results for this
procedure are presented in Section V-A1.
B. Frequency Correlation
In a multipath environment with rich scattering, the signal
experiences frequency-selective fading, which is another valid
random source that can be used for key generation. However,
there will be correlation between adjacent frequencies. In this
section, we exploit the frequency correlation relationship of
the channel estimation bHq[k].
The normalized frequency ACFs of Hq[k] and bHq[k] can be
obtained by letting t = 0 in (22) and (26) and are written
as
RH(f; 0) =
rH(f; 0)
rH(0; 0)
; (31)
and
R bH(fk; fi; 0) = RH(f; 0)SNRfEfe
j2(k i)"q=Mg+ (f)
1 + SNRf
;
(32)
respectively, and shown in Fig. 2.
The frequency ACFs of bHq[k] indicates that it is feasible to
extract keys from multiple subcarriers that are separated by a
certain frequency. This is verified by the randomness test and
the detailed results are shown in Section V-A2.
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Fig. 3. ( bHAtA [k]; bHBtB [k]) of all the subcarriers. SNR = 6 dB.
IV. ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF MEASUREMENTS
CROSS-CORRELATION
In this section, we analyze the effects of non-simultaneous
measurements and noise on the signal cross-correlation and
improve the correlation by an FIR LPF. We consider half-
duplex hardware to make our analysis more general. The
estimated channel responses of Alice and Bob can be given
as bHAtA [k] = eHtA [k] + bwAtA [k]; (33)bHBtB [k] = eHtB [k] + bwBtB [k]; (34)
where tA and tB are the measurement time of Alice and Bob,
respectively. The value tAB = jtA  tBj is deliberately kept
as small as possible to ensure that eHAtA [k] and eHBtB [k] are
highly correlated in a slow fading channel. The noises bwAtA [k]
and bwBtB [k] reside in two hardware platforms and therefore are
independent.
A. Cross-Correlation Relationship
Cross-correlation relationship describes the similarity be-
tween the measured channel responses of Alice and Bob. The
covariance between bHAtA [k] and bHBtB [k] can be calculated as
cov( bHAtA [k]; bHBtB [k]) = cov(HtA [k];HtB [k])Efej2"0k=Mg;
(35)
where "0 = "tA   "tB .
The correlation coefficient between bHAtA [k] and bHBtB [k] can
be given as
( bHAtA [k]; bHBtB [k]) = cov(HtA [k];HtB [k])Efej2"0k=Mg2H + 2w ;
(36)
and the average correlation coefficient of all the subcarriers
can be calculated by
 =
1
M
M 1X
k=0
( bHAtA [k]; bHBtB [k]): (37)
The cross-correlation coefficients of all the subcarriers are
shown in Fig. 3 using SNR = 6 dB as an example. It may
be observed that the cross-correlation coefficients are slightly
different due to the imperfect synchronization at the receiver.
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Fig. 4. The average correlation coefficient against tAB . SNR = 10 dB.
1) Effect of Non-Simultaneous Measurements: Although
Alice and Bob do not measure the channel at the same
time, the channel does not change much in a slow fading
environment as long as tAB is small enough. The average
correlation coefficient against tAB is shown in Fig. 4.
As may be observed from the figure, tAB does not affect
the average correlation coefficients much when it is small. This
time resolution is easy to satisfy. For example, in a 20 MHz
channel spacing IEEE 802.11 OFDM system, the sampling
time difference between Alice and Bob can be configured in
the order of 0.1 ms.
2) Effect of Noise: Noise is then the main factor that
impacts the measurements. The frequency domain components
of the Ht[k] and bHt[k] are shown in Fig. 5 (a) and Fig. 5 (b),
respectively. As shown in (28), Ht[k] has the same temporal
ACF as the channel taps, therefore, their PSD S(f) are the
same as well. The main energy of Ht[k] is then concentrated
in [0; fd]. This can also be observed from Fig. 5 (a). Therefore,
an LPF can be designed to eliminate the high frequency
components which flood bHt[k].
3) Correlation Relationship Approximation: As the channel
does not change much duringtAB , the correlation coefficient
can be approximated to
( bHAtA [k]; bHBtB [k])  cov(HtA [k];HtA [k])Efej2"0k=Mg2H + 2w
=
2HEfej2"
0k=Mg
2H + 
2
w
=
SNRf
1 + SNRf
Efej2"0k=Mg: (38)
The cross-correlation coefficients are mainly determined by
the SNR. We calculate the average correlation coefficients
of all the subcarriers against SNR and show the results in
Fig. 6. The theoretical curve is calculated by the analytical
expression (38) which assumes perfect synchronization, i.e.,
"0 = 0. As may be observed from the figure, when SNR is
low, the correlation coefficients exhibit large deviations from
the theoretical ones. This is because in low SNR environments,
there is a greater difference in the time offsets of Alice and
Bob.
B. Measurements Correlation Improvement
An FIR LPF is proposed to effectively target the elimination
of the noise and improve the SNR and correlation relationship.
The parameters of the LPF are shown in Table II. As the main
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Fig. 5. Frequency domain analysis (magnitude), SNR = 6 dB, fd = 6 Hz.
The figures in the right panes are a zoom of the frequency. (a) Ht[k]; (b)bHt[k]; (c) Filtered bHt[k].
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Fig. 6. The average correlation coefficient in different SNR environments
under an LPF with different sampling frequency.
energy of the Ht[k] is in the range of [0; fd], an LPF with a
cutoff frequency fc of fd is designed to target elimination
of the high frequency components of the noise. However, the
estimation of the Doppler spread is difficult, thus fc is fixed
to fd;max. Key generation has been conventionally aimed at
slow fading environments so that fd;max is very small, e.g.,
6 Hz in a Bell-shaped Doppler power spectrum model [42].
Therefore, keeping fc to fd;max fixed will not greatly impact
the performance.
The noise suppression effect of the LPF is shown in
Fig. 5 (c); it may be observed that the high frequency com-
ponents of the noise is largely eliminated. The improvement
of the correlation relationship for all the subcarriers when
TABLE II
PARAMETERS OF THE DESIGNED LPF
Cutoff frequency fc fd;max
Filter order 20
Kaiser window length 21
Kaiser window  3
SNR = 6 dB is shown in Fig. 3, from which it may be
observed that all the subcarriers have quite similar correlation
coefficients after filtering.
The performance of the LPF with varying sampling frequen-
cies fs in different SNR environments is shown in Fig. 6.
It may be observed from the figure that the LPF produces
a good improvement of the correlation, especially in low
SNR environments. Ideally, a higher sampling frequency fs
is preferred due to its better improvement. However, when the
channel changes slowly and the sampling frequency reaches
some value, e.g., 200 Hz in Fig. 6, any further increase
in the sampling frequency does not contribute much more
to the sampling of the signal variation. Therefore, it is not
necessary to use a very high sampling frequency because
an optimal sampling frequency can be tuned to the signal
variation. This could benefit the application of LPF in cost- and
energy-sensitive devices as it can keep the overhead introduced
by LPF as low as possible while achieving an acceptable
performance.
The hardware cost for the filter is low as it has a small order.
In addition, current 3G cellular devices regularly monitor the
channel at 1500 Hz for closed loop power control. As may
be observed from Fig. 6, a sampling frequency of 200 Hz
already produces a good improvement on the correlation
relationship. Hence, the sampling overhead is well within the
capability of mobile devices. Therefore, the implementation of
the LPF is worthwhile to improve the cross-correlation of the
measurements, while introducing only a small overhead and
cost.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The channel responses of OFDM subcarriers are sampled at
a frequency fs. The sampled data bHq[k] is then passed to the
LPF in order to improve the cross-correlation relationship. The
filter data is later re-sampled by a probing rate Tp to reduce
the redundancy. In our system, a single-bit cumulative distri-
bution function (CDF)-based quantization [16] is adopted to
convert bHq[k] into binary values Kk. These binary sequences
may be used separately as keys to different cryptographic
applications. Alternatively, we can concatenate multiple binary
sequences together to form a longer sequence, i.e., K =
[K1jj:::jjKkjj:::jjKNs ], where jj denotes concatenation and
Ns is the number of uncorrelated subcarriers, which will be
analyzed in detail in Section V-A2. Information reconciliation
technique, such as secure sketch [46], is used to correct the
key disagreement between the users, and privacy amplification
is finally employed to remove the information revealed to
eavesdroppers during the information reconciliation.
In this section, we evaluated the performance of our key
generation system in terms of randomness, KGR, and KDR.
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RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES QUANTIZED FROMbHq [k]. THE PROBING RATES Tp ARE SET AS DIFFERENT X% COHERENCE
TIME Tc(X%).
Corr coeff X% 50% 30% 15% 12% 10% 9%
Tc(X%)(s) 0.067 0.097 0.136 0.154 0.2 0.226
Sequence length 7462 5154 3676 3246 2500 2212
Frequency 0.61 0.956 0.767 0.861 0.968 0.799
Block frequency 0 0.001 0.242 0.185 0.408 0.021
Runs 0 0 0 0.001 0.02 0.046
Longest run of 1s 0 0 0.014 0.824 0.85 0.668
DFT 0 0.005 0.283 0.729 0.054 0.654
Serial 0 0 0.21 0.104 0.211 0.4950 0.257 0.943 0.88 0.107 0.667
Appro. entropy 0 0 0 0.012 0.282 0.472
Cum. sums (fwd) 0.521 0.652 0.565 0.854 0.967 0.252
Cum. sums (rev) 0.316 0.704 0.837 0.743 0.981 0.404
TABLE IV
POWER DISTRIBUTION OF CIR UNDER EXPONENTIAL-DECAY POWER
DELAY PROFILE. THE TOTAL POWER
PL 1
l=0 
2
hl
IS NORMALIZED TO 1.
L 2h1
P1
l=0 
2
hl
P2
l=0 
2
hl
P3
l=0 
2
hl
6 86.47% 98.17% 99.75% 99.96%
11 63.21% 86.46% 95.01% 98.16%
21 39.35% 63.21% 77.69% 86.47%
A. Randomness Test
1) Single Random Source: A statistical randomness test
suite provided by National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) [47] is adopted to test the randomness of
the key sequence generated from the channel responses of
OFDM subcarriers, which is widely used in the key generation
systems [12], [13], [20], [22]. Table III shows the results of
the randomness test of keys quantized from a single subcarrier.
Each test returns a P-value which is compared with a threshold
(0.01 in this paper). The cells highlighted in gray fail the
random test, i.e., P-value < 0:01.
As may be observed from the Table III, using the commonly
acknowledged 50% coherence time Tc(50%) as the probing
rate cannot generate random sequences at all. In these results,
the probing rate needs to be increased to Tc(10%) in order for
the system to be able to extract a random key sequence. This
is the optimal probing rate.
Temporal correlation can also be tackled by using decor-
relation algorithms [16], [25]. The decorrelation algorithms
themselves do not introduce more entropy but only aggregate
the energy. In addition, the algorithms’ complexities increase
with the data block length [48], which may not be applicable
to limited computational capacity devices. A rule of thumb
for the optimal probing rate is thus attractive as it does not
require any other additional signal processing.
2) Multiple Random Source: In a multipath channel with
L independent channel taps, theoretically there should be up
to L independent subcarriers. However, the average power of
the taps is not evenly distributed. For example, it follows an
exponential-decay profile in the indoor environment and the
power will be mostly concentrated in the first few taps, as
shown in Table IV.
Only the taps with short delays are the main contributors
to the randomness. Therefore, the number of uncorrelated
subcarriers for key generation Ns will also be smaller than
L. In this section, we selected Ns subcarriers satisfying
 0:5 < R bH(fk; fi; 0) < 0:5; (39)
quantized them separately and finally concatenated these bi-
nary values to form a new sequence. As may be observed
from Fig. 1, subcarriers have slightly different Tc(X%). In
order to focus on the frequency correlation between two binary
sequences Kk and Ki, we use a relatively large probing rate,
0.5 s, so there will be little temporal correlation within Kk.
NIST randomness test is applied to the new sequence and
the results are shown in Table V. We also did the same process
to the theoretical channel response Hq[k] for comparison.
For all the multipath environments, Ns < L, which matches
our intuitive analysis that the first Ns channel taps are the
dominant contributor to the randomness. In addition, when
there is richer scattering in the environment, i.e., more channel
taps, there are more random sources for extraction, which is
due to that the channel is more frequency-selective.
B. KGR
Channel parameter (CSI, RSS, etc) and probing rate are the
key factors for the KGR. In this paper, due to the employment
of the fine-grained channel responses of OFDM subcarriers
and determination of optimal probing rate, our system can
achieve a much higher KGR than existing single-dimensional
parameter-based key generation systems.
The KGR of single-dimensional parameter-based key gen-
eration systems, e.g., RSS-based systems, can be written as
KGR0 =
1
Tp
: (40)
Single-dimensional parameter-based key generation systems
lose lots of useful information of the channel. For example,
RSS only has amplitude information.
Our scheme can achieve a higher KGR than single-
dimensional parameter-based schemes. Firstly, we can extract
keys from the real and imaginary parts of the channel es-
timation simultaneously, a general feature of key generation
from fine-grained CSI [25], [49], which can double the KGR
compared to the single-dimensional parameter-based systems.
Secondly, we extract randomness from both the time and
frequency domains. In particular, in a frequency-selective
fading channel, there are up to Ns frequencies applicable for
key generation in our scheme, which will significantly improve
the KGR. Therefore, the KGR of our system can be given as
KGR =
NsX
i=1
2
Tp(i)
; (41)
where Tp(i) is ith subcarrier’s optimal probing rate.
C. KDR
As can be observed from Fig. 7, even with the help of the
LPF, there is still disagreement between Alice and Bob. This
is because the noise effect can only be suppressed, but not
9TABLE V
RANDOMNESS TEST RESULTS OF KEY SEQUENCES CONCATENATED FROM MULTIPLE SUBCARRIERS.
L 6 11 21
Data Hq [k] bHq [k] Hq [k] bHq [k] Hq [k] bHq [k]
Ns 1 2 3 4 3 4 4 5 8 9 9 10
Sequence length 1000 2000 3000 4000 3000 4000 4000 5000 8000 9000 9000 10000
Frequency 0.899 0.928 1 0.635 0.97 0.949 0.949 0.909 0.84 0.899 0.966 0.984
Block frequency 0.958 0.604 0.393 0.245 0.477 0.941 0.939 0.478 0.987 0.942 0.282 0.417
Runs 0.164 0.152 0.77 0.129 0.798 0.429 0.974 0.887 0.035 0.016 0.849 0.968
Longest run of 1s 0.66 0.164 0.522 0.712 0.953 0.688 0.824 0.962 0.286 0.024 0.518 0.651
DFT 0.384 0 0.093 0 0.019 0 0.146 0 0.01 0 0.033 0
Serial 0.423 0.101 0.928 0.663 0.237 0.771 0.199 0.336 0.324 0.528 0.594 0.7690.332 0.041 0.841 0.754 0.454 0.8 0.1 0.328 0.623 0.137 0.636 0.664
Appro. entropy 0.33 0.254 0.988 0.228 0.305 0.809 0.692 0.398 0.044 0.511 0.367 0.591
Cum sum (fwd) 0.989 0.956 0.948 0.736 0.744 0.965 0.989 0.954 0.997 0.999 0.979 0.986
Cum sum (rev) 0.999 0.902 0.948 0.876 0.778 0.986 0.989 0.881 0.999 0.987 0.963 0.981
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Fig. 7. The average KDR in different SNR environments
completely eliminated. Therefore, information reconciliation
is necessary to make Alice and Bob agree on the same key.
However, all the information reconciliation techniques are
upper bounded by the correction capacity. Taking the secure
sketch [46] as an example, the [n; k; t] BCH code can be
implemented to correct the disagreement with a maximum
correction capacity rate of
 =
tmax
n
=
2m 2   1
2m   1 ; (42)
which approaches 0.25 when m becomes large. The KDR
should be smaller than the correction capacity  in order to
guarantee all the disagreement to be corrected by information
reconciliation. There is a lower bound of SNR for the key
generation working successfully, which equals 8 dB when
there is no LPF, or 4 dB when the correlation is improved
by the LPF with sampling frequency fs = 100 Hz or higher,
as shown in Fig. 7. This extends the working SNR range
by 4 dB. Even in high SNR environments, the introduction
of LPF is still beneficial. A reduction in the KDR decreases
the burden of the information reconciliation, and can ease its
design. In addition, a lower KDR requires fewer rounds of
information reconciliation and less information is revealed to
eavesdroppers. Therefore, the correlation improvement by LPF
can make the key generation system much more efficient.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
An efficient key generation system that exploits the ran-
domness from OFDM subcarrier’s channel responses is pro-
posed. The efficiency is achieved by using an optimal probing
rate, randomness extraction from multiple subcarriers, and
improved cross-correlation of the measurements.
The appropriateness of OFDM subcarrier’s channel re-
sponses as a random source for key generation is verified
through theoretical modelling and analysis. The time and
frequency autocorrelation relationship of the OFDM sub-
carrier’s channel responses is modelled theoretically and it
helps determine the optimal probing rate and the number
of subcarriers that can be used for key extraction. Cross-
correlation of the channel measurements is modelled and
noise is found to have a more detrimental effect than non-
simultaneous measurements in a slow fading channel. An
LPF is subsequently proposed to suppress the high frequency
components of noise, improve the cross-correlation coefficient
and reduce the KDR, which extends the SNR working range
of the system. We evaluated our system in terms of ran-
domness, KGR and KDR, and showed that OFDM subcar-
rier’s channel responses are valid for key generation. In a
real environment, the channel may change dynamically due
to uncontrolled movement of users/objects, which results in
variable statistical channel features, such as varying Doppler
spread and coherence bandwidth. Optimal probing rate and
uncorrelated subcarriers selection are determined by Doppler
spread and coherence bandwidth, respectively. Our future work
will be to design an adaptive key generation system exploiting
randomness from time and frequency domains, which adjusts
the probing parameters according to the channel condition.
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